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1   Historical Reconciliation: A Ten-Year Reassessment
A little over a decade ago, I participated in a multinational research project on historical 
reconciliation that was organized by Dr. Funabashi Yoichi and supported by the Tokyo Foun-
dation. Our small team included prominent scholars and policy experts from the US, Japan, 
and Australia and subsequently produced a publication in both Japanese and English. Simul-
taneously Dr. Funabashi convened another team that consisted of scholars in Japan and pub-
lished a similar book in Japanese. These two conferences and publications were significant 
landmarks in the discussion of confronting historical trauma and historical reconciliation in 
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With the return of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in December 2012 and his visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine exactly a year later, history issues that have largely been on the 
backburner in Japan-China relations are once again making headlines and are likely 
to dominate bilateral relations. Whereas this seems to bring China-Japan relations 
back to Prime Minister Koizumi’s tenure at the beginning of the new millennium, the 
basic contours of this relationship have experienced important shifts. The continued 
economic trends, the escalation of territorial disputes, and the adoption of the “Asia 
Pivot” policy by the U.S., are bound to shape this crucial relationship between China 
and Japan. What does it mean now to speak of historical reconciliation in general 
and between China and Japan in particular? Has reconciliation become a more re-
mote goal now that tensions between these two giant neighbors have allegedly risen to 
the level seen on the eve of World War I? Are there any roles for historians and the 
scholarly community to play at such a critical juncture? Although much more sectors 
must be involved to reduce the rising tension between the two countries, I argue that 
historians can still play a crucial role in clarifying conflicting interpretations over 
various disputes as well as promote a new history that transcend national boundaries 
in the long run.
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East Asia.1 It is thus appropriate to use them as points of departure.
The launch of these two projects by the Tokyo Foundation marked a significant moment at 
the start of the new millennium. Since the first textbook incident of the early 1980s, the East 
Asia region has seen what can be described as a history war, largely over Japan’s colonial 
and wartime expansion in Asia. Issues such as visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine by 
Japanese leaders, statements by Japanese politicians denying or minimizing Japanese aggres-
sion or atrocities, among others, have regularly thrown Japan’s relations with its East Asian 
neighbors into disarray. Beginning from the 1990s, voices of former victims of Japan’s war-
time atrocities, among them the so-called military comfort women, began to be heard as they 
demanded official apologies and compensation. In response, the Japanese government took a 
number of measures such as the 1995 Murayama Statement and the Asia Women’s Fund. 
Moreover, how to deal with historical trauma and bring about historical justice has become a 
regional as well as global concern. In Asia Pacific, issues such as aborigines’ rights in Austra-
lia （and Canada） and the 2.28 incident in Taiwan, make historical reconciliation a particular-
ly pertinent task on the eve of the new millennium. Truth and Reconciliation commissions in 
South Africa and Latin America over domestic human rights abuses as well as renewed com-
pensation lawsuits in Europe against Germany began to create a global discourse on historical 
justice. 
Ironically, these conferences and publications nearly coincided with a new wave of history 
wars in East Asia. I recall vividly at the post-conference dinner in 2001, the South Korean 
Ambassador Cho Sangyong had an animated discussion with a Japanese guest over the Fuso-
sha history textbook that downplayed Japan’s wartime atrocities in Asia. Ambassador Cho 
was soon recalled by the Korean Government in protest over Japanese Government’s approv-
al of a slightly revised Fusosha textbook. After that, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s an-
nual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine despite protest from both Korea and China escalated the 
history war to the highest level of diplomacy as Beijing and Seoul eventually refused to hold 
summit with Japan. Just as the Fusosha revisionist textbook was the result of the backlash 
against a series of steps taken by the Japanese government in the 1990s toward reconciling 
with Japan’s neighbors, Koizumi’s insistence on paying annual visit to the controversial war 
shrine reflected what some call “apology fatigue” among many Japanese. 
Having briefly reviewed the background, it is fair to ask the following questions: what has 
changed since our first major academic endeavor to address historical reconciliation over a 
decade ago? What remains the same? What new insights have we gained over this period?
First of all, that round of the history war seemed to have entered at a phase of ceasefire 
after the departure of Koizumi from office in 2006. His successor, Abe Shinzo, made fence-
mending trips to neighboring China and Korea soon after taking office before visiting any oth-
er countries. Although Abe did not stay in office for long, he refrained from visiting the Yasu-
kuni Shrine, an example followed by his Liberal Democratic Party （LDP） successors as well 
as Prime Ministers of the Democratic Party （DPJ） that came to power in 2009. Although 
1 Funabashi Nihon no sensô sekinin wo dô kangaeru ka ［How to consider Japan’s war responsibility?］, edited by 
Funabashi Yôichi （Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 2001）; English translation is Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific, Yoichi 
Funabashi, ed., （Washington, DC: USIP, 2003）,
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Abe did cause some consternation when he appeared to challenge the 1992 Kono Statement 
admitting the Japanese government involvement in the wartime military comfort women sys-
tem, he modified his position quickly. In return, leaders of neighboring China （and South Ko-
rea） reciprocated by not making history issues at the forefront of their Japan diplomacy. Po-
litical reconciliation at the top seemed to have taken a step forward.
Moreover, historical reconciliation also moved ahead at the level of society. In addition to 
increased exchanges between ordinary citizens, dialogues among historians in East Asia has 
made much progress in the last decade. Now we have several jointly authored supplementary 
history books among Japan, Korea, and China. The one that has garnered most attention is 
the History that Opens the Future, published in all three countries in 2005. For the first time 
ever, countries in East Asia have engaged in official joint historical research. Following the 
precedent of Japan-Korea Joint Historical Research, China and Japan embarked on a similar 
endeavor in late 2006 under the Abe administration, coinciding with the diplomatic “thawing” 
and cooling down of the history war between the two countries. In a sense, as some have 
pointed out, the establishment of the joint historical research helps managing the diplomatic 
crisis, by allowing both governments to focus on other pressing issues such as trade and envi-
ronment.
However, the history war has never really ended, but simmered in other ways. A few Jap-
anese politicians including elected officials as well as Diet members continue to unsettle Ja-
pan’s neighbors over history issues. Nationalist revision of history in Japan is no longer limit-
ed to manga artist Kobayashi Yoshinori or the Society for New History Textbooks. On the 
other hand, patriotic education in China continues to emphasize war of resistance against Ja-
pan as well as Japanese wartime atrocities. Anti-Japanese popular nationalism remains deeply 
entrenched in China, if the 2011 violent mass demonstrations are any indication. Economic 
problems—whether the continued stagnation in Japan or the rising inequality in China—often 
make an external adversary convenient. Whether out of own conviction or, as many analysts 
suggest, out of concern for their legitimacy, Chinese leaders are not ready to make full recon-
ciliation with Japan over history issues.
Fast-forward to 2014. In the wake of Prime Minister Abe’s recent visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine, the first by a Japanese Prime Minister in seven years, the process of historical recon-
ciliation experienced a severe setback. Will China-Japan relations return to the Koizumi years 
in the shadow of the shrine visits? 
To better answer this question, we must keep in mind larger trends in the region and the 
world. Firstly, compared to ten years ago, China’s economy has overtaken Japan in terms of 
overall GDP, perhaps for the first time in modern history. The economic inter-dependence has 
also deepened. Secondly, in the military and security arena, the steady double-digit increase 
of China’s military spending, coupled with what many describe as aggressive posture in Chi-
na’s surrounding waters, has prompted the U.S. to adopt Pivot to Asia. Also relevant is the 
changing society and the rapidly rising spread of internet use in both countries, although im-
plications still await further analysis.
Moreover, both China and Japan are under new leadership: in the case of China a once-
every-10-year change of top leadership and in Japan, the rise and fall of the Democratic Par-
ty and the return of LDP dominance. Whatever his accomplishment in reviving Japan’s sag-
ging economy, the return of Abe Shinzo as Prime Minister provides many ominous signs of 
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the return of history issues. His obsession about revising the postwar constitution goes hand-
in-hand with his strong personal convictions that Japan （and his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke） 
have been wrongly vilified by the Allies as well as postwar Japanese Left. His appointment 
of several like-minded “true-believers” in historical revisionism to important posts in the LDP 
and the cabinet was an early sign. They share the same fundamental views on history with 
those outside LDP such as Hashimoto Toru and Ishihara Shintaro. Moreover, in contrast to 
Koizumi, who emphasized China was not a threat to Japan, Abe went to great lengths around 
the world to warn about the rise of China and to seek allies. Given these reasons, relations 
between Japan and China are in greater danger of a free fall and a thaw between the leaders 
is unlikely to happen at least in the short run.
2   History Reconciliation in the Age of Territorial Dispute
More importantly, a new front has been opened that has close links to the ongoing history 
war: territorial disputes. Like other international disputes, disputes over territory are often 
supposed to be simply a matter of international law. Yet, the legitimacy of territorial claims is 
inevitably bound with history, or rather, the interpretations of history: who first discovered 
the territory in question? What was the nature and circumstances of the territorial annexa-
tion? Moreover, the history of the countries involved as well as their bilateral relations holds 
the key to understanding why the dispute has risen at particular moments. The linkage of 
these two issues, at least on the Chinese side, shows the danger of stalled reconciliation and 
makes further progress on both fronts more challenging.
What is the current territorial dispute about? While economic interest, identity, security, 
domestic politics have all played a role, perhaps even a dominant one, at its core, the dispute 
between China and Japan boils down to two fundamental issues: first, PRC （as well as 
ROC） and Japan all claim Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as its inherent sovereign territory; second, 
Japan and PRC disagree whether there was a tacit agreement between their leaders in the 
1970s to shelve the dispute.
It is true that in addition to basing their claims on history and law, China also emphasizes 
geography and geology: these Islands are situated on the continental shelf extending from 
China and strong currents along the Okinawa Trough to the east has served as a natural bor-
der between China and the Ryûkyû Kingdom, present-day Okinawa. It is also true that the 
two sides have different interpretations of several major international agreements such as the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. As it is clear from reviewing the prehistory of the dis-
pute, however, the differences between China and Japan are fundamentally a difference over 
modern history.
The prehistory of the dispute can be roughly divided into four phases. In Phase One, at 
least beginning from the early 15th century, these Islands frequently appeared in Chinese re-
cords under Chinese names, largely serving as navigation aids for periodic official Chinese 
missions to the Ryûkyû Kingdom, a tributary state to China and Japan. These Chinese re-
cords served as the source of knowledge of the Islands in Ryûkyû and Japan, although sea-
farers from Ryûkyû likely knew the Islands independently. Phase Two begins from the 1870s, 
when Japan reduced Ryûkyû Kingdom to a feudal domain （han） and then annexed it com-
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pletely, and ends with the Japanese cabinet decision to annex the Islands in January 1895. 
Although the Japanese government once offered the southernmost group of Ryûkyû islands 
to Qing China around 1880, a move that would have made the later dispute moot, the latter 
did not accept it. Private Japanese made the first explorations of the Islands in the 1880s but 
the central government in Tokyo refrained from annexing them as Japanese territory for fear 
of complications with China until 1895. In Phase Three, Japan administered the Islands as 
part of Okinawa Prefecture. Around the turn of the 20th century they came to be known in 
Japanese as Senkaku, which was a direct translation of the name Pinnacle Islands, initially 
given to some of the islands by the British Navy in the mid-19th century. The Japanese gov-
ernment leased several islands to a Japanese businessman who built a fish packing factory on 
one of them until 1940. In Phase Four, following Japan’s surrender in World War II in August 
1945, these islands were placed under the U.S. administration, along with Okinawa and other 
Japanese islands until they were handed over to Japan in 1972. 
A comparison of the official Chinese and Japanese narratives shows some key differences: 
Japan’s position is that first, Japan legally annexed the Islands in early 1895 based on the 
principle of terra nullius （land without owners） in modern international law; secondly, sover-
eignty has resided with Japan ever since, even when they were under U.S. administration be-
fore their return in 1972; moreover, China （Qing, R.O.C. or P.R.C.） did not raise any objec-
tions until 1970, a year after prospects of oil and gas deposits were announced. On the other 
hand, similar to Taiwan, China argues that firstly, the islands have been Chinese territory 
since the Ming Dynasty based on Chinese historical records; secondly, Japan illegally an-
nexed the Islands in the midst of war with China in early 1895; lastly, the Islands should 
have been returned to China after World War II on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration of 
1945, which reiterated the 1943 Cairo Declaration that territories stolen from China should 
be returned. The two sides thus differ sharply over the meaning of discovery and ownership; 
they also have different emphasis within the prehistory: whereas China attaches great impor-
tance to Phase One of Chinese initial discovery, Japan places emphasis on Phase Three of 
unchallenged Japanese administration.
At least two underlying themes lie behind what is obviously a complicated situation: First, 
there are diametrically opposite views of history underlying these official narratives. In the 
Chinese view, the history since the late 19th century was unrelenting Japanese expansion at 
its own expense. It began with Japan’s annexation of the Ryûkyû Kingdom: after Japan sev-
ered the centuries-old tributary ties between China and Ryûkyû in 1875, those islands in be-
tween that had long served as navigation signposts rarely appeared in Chinese records. China 
considers the Islands to be “stolen” by Japan during the 1894-1895 war and should be re-
turned to China after World War II, since the Cairo Declaration of 1943, later reaffirmed by 
the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, stipulated that Japan would be expelled from all other ter-
ritories which she has taken by violence and greed.
On the other hand, Japan views developments in the late 19th century such as its annexa-
tion of Ryûkyû （called Ryûkyû Settlement Ryûkyû shobun）, Bonin Islands as well as the is-
lands later named Senkaku to be lawful territorial consolidation unrelated to its overseas mili-
tary ventures or colonial expansion. In fact, no mention was made of the ongoing war with 
China which had gone in Japan’s favor at the time of the cabinet decision to annex the Is-
lands in early 1895, similar to Japan’s de-linking the Russo-Japanese War with its annexation 
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of Dokdo/Takeshima. Needless to say, Japan differs over the applicability of the Cairo and 
Potsdam Declarations. Instead, Japan considers the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed be-
tween Japan and major Allied Countries in 1951, to have reaffirmed Japan’s sovereignty over 
the Islands.
The dispute is also exacerbated by the different and evolving views of sovereignty and ter-
ritorial boundary. Studies have shown that the traditional East Asian international regime that 
existed until the late 19th century had very different perceptions of sovereignty and territorial 
boundaries from the modern Westphalian system. The Ryûkyû Kingdom had been paying 
tribute to China since the Ming Dynasty and continued to do so after the Satsuma han of Ja-
pan established control through force in 1609. Similarly, the need to demarcate maritime 
boundaries and to establish internationally recognized markers was not universally recognized 
in the region until the late 19th century. Moreover, the evolving international maritime regime, 
including the 1982 United Nations Conventions on Law of the Sea, also has raised the stakes 
of the disputes among neighboring countries with overlapping claims. China considers its far 
longer, documented knowledge of the Islands dating back to the 15th century to be a key 
component of its claim. In contrast, Japanese government justifies its annexation of the Is-
lands in terms of the modern international legal principle of terra nullis. Japanese leaders in 
the Meiji era insisted that those islands were without traces of Chinese administration even 
as they acknowledged their presence in earlier Chinese records. In any case, these leaders 
certainly believed legal territorial claims worked the best from a position of undisputed 
strength, which Japan clearly established vis-à-vis China at the beginning of 1895 when its 
troops were poised to advance toward China’s capital and to occupy Taiwan.
Even though the territorial dispute is not all about history, vastly diverging views of history 
as well as overall mutual popular negativity makes the solution difficult. That is to say, lack of 
deep historical reconciliation makes disputes difficult to resolve.
3   Prospect for Reconciliation in East Asia
With territorial disputes added to the fray and the recent setback in historical reconcilia-
tion, some may find it no longer practical to even speak of reconciliation as a practical policy 
goal.
This needs not be the case, however. Instead, we should be aware of the depth of the 
problem and pursue both short-term goals to prevent further deterioration without abandon-
ing the goal of long-term reconciliation. One important development in the past decade is a 
new crop of scholarship in English focusing on historical trauma, memory and reconciliation, 
offering new ways to look at the issue.
In particular, recent years have seen a great outpouring of works on the subject of histori-
cal reconciliation.2 In a study on conflict resolution and reconciliation, Israeli scholar Yaacov 
2 See, for example, Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices （New York: 
Norton, 2000）; John Torpey ed., Politics and the Past: On repairing Historical Injustice （New York: Roman & Lit-
tlefield, 2003）.
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Bar-Siman-Tov confirms what many others have also concluded: reconciliation is both an 
outcome and process. As he points out, it consists of mutual recognition and acceptance, in-
vested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust, positive attitudes, as 
well as sensitivity and consideration for the other party’s needs and interests. The essence of 
reconciliation, in his view, is a psychological process, which consists of changes of the moti-
vation, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of the majority of society members. The goal of 
such reconciliation may seem unnecessarily high, but he makes the convincing argument that 
“reconciliation is required when the societies involved in a conflict involve widely shared be-
liefs, attitudes, motivations, and emotions that support adherence to the conflictive goals, 
maintain the conflict, de-legitimize the opponent, and thus negate the possibility of peaceful 
resolution and prevent the development of peaceful relations.”3 Such a reminder if all the 
more timely when we consider rising tensions between Japan and China.
Influenced by both overall scholarly trends but certainly by recurrent problems in East 
Asia, many dissertations and books have been devoted to the question how past and present 
are intertwined. If some works have a more academic orientation that focus on the shapes of 
historical memories, others take on the issues of conflict over history right on. As can be ex-
pected, these scholars often have different emphasis and even different conclusions. For in-
stance, Yinan He places the blame of memory wars on what she calls “elite myth-making,” 
while James Reilly sees citizens’ movement symbolized by what he calls “history activists” 
playing a greater role in China. Adopting a comparative approach, the research team at Stan-
ford University Asia Pacific Research Center analyzed history textbooks from Japan and its 
Asian neighbors and found varying degree of nationalism and distortion in all. Indeed, Thom-
as Berger’s comparison of Japan with Austria as well as Germany reveals that the common 
contrast of Japan as the model “unrepentant” versus Germany as the model “penitent” to be 
grossly oversimplified.4
Several scholars have focused on the question of reconciliation itself. Jennifer Lind sees 
the single-minded quest for a perfect apology as a path to reconciliation to be misplaced as it 
tends to produce backlashes at home and hence undermine the work of reconciliation. Au-
thor of a major study of reconciliation in postwar German foreign policy, Lily Gardner Feld-
man ventures to offer useful lessons for East Asia.5 Indeed, the European experience has of-
ten been evoked in discussing reconciliation in East Asia by some politicians in Japan and 
elsewhere in East Asia. Recent works have cautioned us applying the European model in a 
simplistic manner. For one thing, Europe continues to have its own history problems, suggest-
ing there is really no END to reconciliation but it is an ongoing process. But the European 
experience is far from being irrelevant, as Thomas Berger argues. The much praised Franco-
German reconciliation demonstrates, for instance, that reconciliation preceded multi-dimen-
3 Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov ed. From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation （Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004）, pp. 
13-17.
4 Yinan He, The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II （Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2009）; James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s 
Japan Policy （Columbia University Press, 2011）; Thomas Berger, War, Guilt and World Politics After World War II 
（Cambridge University Press, 2012）.
5 Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics （Cornell University, 2010）; Lily Gardener Feldman, 
Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation （Rowman Littlefield, 2012）.
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sional setting: the two counties were bound by a US-dominated security community and im-
portantly economic bonds. Grass-root, local government and civil society played indispensable 
roles by creating and deepening numerous cross-border ties, be it sister-cities or study-abroad. 
Finally, more than just endeavoring to make political, economic and security relations closer, 
national leaders undertook symbolic actions that facilitated the cause of reconciliation.
What is the role of external actors, especially the U.S., in East Asian reconciliation? This 
question must be answered at different levels. The unprecedented open expression of “disap-
pointment” by the U.S. immediately following Abe’s Yasukuni visit is an indication of the 
widely shared recognition of how sensitive the history issues are. The U.S. government does 
not wish to see an escalation of the history war in East Asia, especially if it is between two 
U.S. allies—Japan and Korea. In the arena of security, the U.S. intends to strengthen the de-
fense alliance with Japan and encourage cooperation between Japan and Korea, thus counter-
ing a rising China. Moreover, the U.S. has its own un-reconciled past with Japan in World 
War II when it comes to fire-bombing and the nuclear destruction of Japanese cities. As a re-
sult, the U.S. government has not and will not apply same kind of pressure on Japan as it did 
with Germany over war-related compensation lawsuits.6 On the other hand, academics and 
civil society in the U.S. and other Western countries should have a different agenda. In fact, 
those interested in historical justice and dialogue as major academic and policy concerns are 
reaching out to East Asia.7 They can remind East Asia of the danger of rampant nationalism 
in every country and how history education can affect reconciliation and conflict. They can 
serve as bridge between global discourse and regional action. In short, they can play a useful 
role in facilitating reconciliation in East Asia.
4   Historians and Historical Reconciliation
If we agree with Bar-Siman-Tov that reconciliation in essence is a psychological process 
consisting of changes of the motivation, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of the majority 
of society members, then history dialogue is an essential part of the reconciliation process. 
While history dialogue alone is not sufficient to bring about reconciliation, no genuine recon-
ciliation can be achieved without addressing disputed history between so-called “historical 
enemies” since historical perception is at the core of those “widely shared beliefs, attitudes, 
motivations, and emotions.”
Once considered the custodians of the past, historians, especially those affiliated with edu-
cation and research institutions, clearly have a role in this. This is not because historians 
alone always determine a country’s public stance on specific history issues. The fiasco over 
Smithsonian’s Enola Gay exhibition in 1995 demonstrates that populism and special interest 
groups can gain upper hand in such public debates over history.8 There is need to articulate 
6 It came closest in the late 1990s when the Congress mandated the establishment of Nazi German and Imperial 
Japanese Government Disclosure Act.
7 For example, see the http://www.historicaljusticeandmemorynetwork.net/ based at Columbia University.
8 Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt eds., History wars: the Enola Gay and other battles for the American past 
（New York : Metropolitan Books, 1996）.
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how views of the past are formed in important groups: political elites, opinion leaders, as well 
as public at large. Efforts must be made at various levels, and its success also depends much 
on economic as well as international environment. Still, when significant portions of histori-
ans in both countries can claim to share much understanding about a common past, or even 
agree to disagree over interpretation on some issues, then they would have done much to in-
sulate the potentially disruptive problems of history. These historians at least have the poten-
tial to shape public policy related to history issues, and perhaps more importantly as a com-
munity they can also influence the public discourse at large.
In the short run, there are still things historians can do to diffuse tensions over the territo-
rial dispute. While other contributing factors need to be taken into consideration, the differ-
ent views of history have long exacerbated the current territorial disputes and can be used to 
justify unilateral actions. Left unattended, the consequence is stark. Fortunately, there are 
now a number of mechanisms of addressing disputes over history through dialogue even 
though none promises perfect solutions. In fact, in governments sponsored a Joint Historical 
Study from 2006 to 2010, teams of leading historians from each country surveyed the entire 
history of China-Japan relations under a common framework agreed upon in advance. Al-
though this joint historical study did not meet all its goals, it at least temporarily de-linked 
the contentious history issues from overall bilateral relations, affirmed areas of substantial 
agreement, narrowed the difference over some issues while clarifying many remaining ones.
Leading scholars from China and Japan should initiate a new phase of the Joint Historical 
Study. Participating as independent scholars instead of national spokespersons, the members 
will engage in collaborative work to study the conflicting historical claims related to the dis-
puted islands and produce a common set of relevant historical documents, similar to the one 
made between Japan and Russia in 1992. Equally important, the joint study should clarify the 
changing perceptions of sovereignty and territorial boundary as well as introduce new per-
spectives for understanding the past other than diplomatic and political history centered on 
the nation-state. It will sponsor academic conferences that are open to respected scholars 
from other countries. The findings of these joint studies should be made public. The Chinese 
and Japanese governments should endeavor to make available all relevant official records. 
While direct mediation by a third party may be unrealistic for resolving the dispute, academic 
institutions and civil society in the United States and Europe can play a positive role by en-
couraging and supporting constructive dialogues between Japan and China. They can host 
academic and policy discussions, and participate in joint history projects between Japan and 
China as observers.
In the long run, dialogue between historians, and between all professions at all possible 
levels must be expanded and institutionalized. Here, looking at the example from Europe 
may be helpful. In 1958, the West German government established a German Historical Insti-
tute （Institut Historique Allemand） in France, the first such institution set up since the end 
of World War II. Located in Paris, its primary objective was to promote the study of modern 
history and to ensure closer ties between the historians of both countries. Its activities include 
supporting young graduate students, holding regular weekly presentations as well as annual 
conferences, and publishing joint works as well as Documents on Western Europe. The GHI 
in Paris also serves as a hub that connects with a variety of research centers in West Germa-
ny, France, and Belgium, playing a unique role in the European scholarly community.9 The 
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success of GHI in Paris was followed by the establishment of GHI in London in 1976, and 
the US in 1987. The trend continued after the reunification of Germany. In 1993 and 2003, 
two GHIs were opened in two former Eastern Bloc countries, Poland and Russia, respectively. 
It is not difficult to see a pattern here: all the five countries with GHI have been involved in 
major conflicts with Germany in modern times. GHI has served as a vehicle for postwar Ger-
many to build a solid foundation of historians’ community with each of its major adversaries 
that also have had long historical ties. Such an approach seems consistent with the overall 
German policy toward its history problem. It has largely succeeded in doing so.
Needless to say, there are major differences between Germany and East Asia, both in 
terms of their modern history and academic traditions. Almost all German universities are 
public and thus subject to closer state control （and in a sense GHIs function as an overseas 
extension of the German higher education and research system）; Moreover, between Japan 
and US （and other countries） there are already a number of well-established channels of ac-
ademic exchange （though none of them specifically devoted to the study of history）. Still, a 
modified version of GHI would be highly useful as a long-term strategy, for creating a wid-
ened community of discourse on history among countries in the Asia Pacific region that are 
most closely involved historically with Japan. U.S. and China obviously fall under this catego-
ry, so does Korea. 
Institutionalized historical dialogue in East Asia should seek to establish a genuine basis for 
a transnational community of historians in the long run, which is crucial to resolving the his-
tory problem as a recurrent and disruptive irritant in Japan’s diplomacy with these countries. 
Thus, shared value in scientific inquiry should be the foremost ultimate rationale instead of 
short-term gains in public diplomacy. Moreover, to gain international credibility and to main-
tain intellectual vitality, there must be the right balance between government and private 
partnership. In fact, the Moscow GHI is funded by two private German foundations: Krupp 
Foundation and Zeit Foundation. In Japan, Toyota, Sasakawa and other foundations can con-
ceivably play such a role. In addition, there should be Japanese and foreign partnership. 
Though director of each GHI is a German professor seconded from a German university, the 
advisory committee of each GHI consists of both German and nationals of the countries in-
volved. Lastly, it can （and probably should） make use of existing institutions such as Japan’s 
Center for Asia Historical Materials or the bilateral history commissions between Japan and 
Korea and between Japan and China.
5   Conclusion
Reviving stalled historical reconciliation between China and Japan in time of growing ten-
sions calls for concerted efforts at different levels and across a broad range of disciplines. It 
also requires us to pay attention to internal dynamic in each society and explore possible 
linkage between internal reconciliation and external reconciliation. I raised this question in a 
9 John T. O’Connor, “The Deutsches Historisches Institut Paris,” French Historical Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1. （Spring, 
1977）, pp. 173-177.
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book I co-edited with two Korean-American scholars.10 On the one hand, the progress in ad-
dressing internal past wrongs in Korea gives its leaders moral authority to reach out to former 
perpetrator countries, as then President Kim Daejung of South Korea has done during his his-
toric visit to Japan in 1998. Yet, the fruits of Korea’s internal reconciliation is far from being 
guaranteed. Japan’s relationship with Okinawa perhaps is another case where international 
reconciliation can contribute to regional reconciliation.11
The historical reconciliation must also be a regional endeavor that goes beyond China and 
Japan. It is time for a regional East Asian Reconciliation Fund whose mandate is to facilitate 
historical reconciliation. Locales like Okinawa that has a special history in pre-modern East 
Asian peaceful exchange but embroiled in modern history of trauma can become a special fa-
cilitator of regional reconciliation. The Seoul-based Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, estab-
lished in 2011 as the first inter-governmental organization in Northeast Asia, should also un-
dertake historical reconciliation as one of its key missions.
The road to true and lasting reconciliation in East Asia is a long and tortuous one. This 
should not be the cause of giving up and doing nothing, nor leaving it to time to heal old 
wounds because time can also deepen them. My own prediction for the next five years---un-
der LDP-Abe and Xi leaderships is that the best we can hope for at top-level is another 
truce, though it is now much more difficult than Abe’s first term in office after Koizumi 
years. That leaves the challenge to civil society in Japan and, to a lesser extent China （and 
the U.S.）, to take the lead in continuing and expanding groundwork for reconciliation. Deep-
ening understanding and combating nationalist prejudice must be a top priority. As part of a 
multi-front endeavor aimed at achieving this goal, China and Japan should further expand 
scholarly exchanges including the studies of history. Just as important, the two countries 
should publicize their collaborative work among museum curators, history educators as well 
as journalists and opinion leaders so as to narrow gaps in historical understanding among the 
general public.
10 Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The Korean Experience, edited by Gi-wook 
Shin, Soonwon Park and Daqing Yang （Routledge, 2006）.
11 This is the argument of “Japanese Historical Reconciliation Should Begin at Home with Okinawa” by Somei Ko-
bayashi, Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 218 （May 2013）.
